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98 Santha Rasaiah and David Newell
directive, proposing individual licensing and general authorization 
illustrates some of them. How is an electronic newspaper to be classi­
fied? As another form of the printed press or as a subject of telecom 
licensing? The answer might determine the extent to which its content 
can be regulated or the entity made available or who can issue it. It 
could also determine who makes those regulations. In Germany, for 
example, it will determine whether regional or federal government 
decides on the appropriate controls.
The Commission’s updated Action Plan^° suggests that there will be 
many opportunities for these issue to be raised—the green paper on 
new audio visual services, the green paper on commercial communica­
tions, the Media Concentration Directive, directives on telecommuni­
cations, ISDN, and privacy issues, and the various communications on 
industrial and regulatory aspects of the new service industries, on 
industry, the citizen, and the information society. 1996 may show 
whether debate within the Information Society Forum will yield con­
sensus or merely inject further contradictory opinions into the debate.
® Available from the Information Society Project Office, European Commission, BU 24-2/ 
78, 200 Rue de la loi, B-1049 BRUSSELS.
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MONROE PRICE* AND JONATHAN WEINBERGt
I
For the first fifty years of the history of broadcasting in the United 
States, two models, not one, governed ownership and regulation in the 
electronic media. US regulators oversaw a monopoly in telecommuni­
cations (though not a State monopoly, as in European Countries). By 
contrast, US law provided for competition in broadcasting. While 
AT&T, the monopoly telephone carrier, controlled nearly all tel­
ephone traffic, US regulators established a system of competing pri­
vate broadcast stations.
Technology weakened this system’s underlying categories. The en­
try of cable television caused the traditional model of competition 
among local broadcast stations to lose much of its meaning. Increas­
ingly, video programming came to be distributed through natural- 
monopoly cable systems, rather than through local broadcast stations. 
At the same time, the monopoly model for telephony came under 
technological and legal attack. The federal courts in the 1970s opened 
the door for competition in long-distance services;' the possibility of 
competition in the local loop came not long after.
By the late 1980s, regulators contemplated the possibilities that 
telephone companies could compete with cable and that cable could 
compete in providing local exchange services. The cable industry 
began to relax its opposition to telephone company entry into cable, 
as cable saw a powerful business opportunity for itself in the markets 
formerly reserved for telephone companies. Industry negotiators 
began exploring the possibility of legislation to lift the prohibitions 
keeping each industry out of the other’s territory. The federal courts 
began to question the constitutionality of rules forbidding tele­
phone companies from providing video programming, or owning cable
* Professor of Law, Yeshiva University, 
t Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University.
' See MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 580 F2d 590 (DC Cir.), cert, denied, 439 US 980 
(1978); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F2d 365 (DC Cir. 1977), cert, denied 434 
US 1040 (1978).
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television systems, in their telephone service areas.^ It became clear 
that the prohibitions segregating cable television from telephone 
service would not survive.
In this essay, we examine traditional US thinking concerning mass 
media ownership. We then review recent developments, including the 
just-enacted Telecommunications Act of 1996. Changes in ownership 
regulation reveal changing understandings of the goals of media 
policy. Under traditional US policy, telephone companies and cable 
companies were kept at arm’s length from each other; the law re­
quired television stations and cable systems in common viewing areas 
to be separately owned; and there were carefully calibrated limita­
tions on the number of radio or television stations any one entity 
could hold. Almost all of that has now been swept away.
II
Traditional US thinking regarding mass media ownership and control 
has rested on two assumptions. The first is descriptive: it predicts that 
a speaker’s identity will strongly influence the content of his speech. 
The second is normative: it prescribes that the owner of the physical 
communications resources—printing press, broadcast station, or 
whatever—used to disseminate speech should control that speech.
The first assumption posits a link between the identity of a speaker 
and the content of its speech. Speakers, the theory runs, tell stories 
reflecting their own backgrounds, identities, and views.^ Government 
policies affecting the identity of speakers will affect the content of 
those stories.
The second assumption derives from the central role of private 
autonomy, and property rights, in US constitutional thinking. A 
foundational theme of US free-speech philosophy has been that gov­
ernment’s role in the market-place of ideas is presumptively limited to 
the enforcement of property rights in communications resources, and 
other common law support for private ordering. A crucial role of free 
speech, the theory runs, is to serve as a check on overreaching govern­
ment;'* free speech is best protected front government interference 
and is best able to fulfill that role when the private owner of commu­
nications resources controls their use.^ Consistently with that vision.
^ The leading decision is Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F3d 181 (4th 
Cir. 1994), vacated for consideration of mootness, 116 SCt 1036 (1996).
^ See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 US 547, 569-83 (1990); Wendy M. Rogovin, ‘The 
Regulation of Television in the Public Interest; On Creating a Parallel Universe in Which 
Minorities Speak and Are Heard’, 42 Catholic LRev. 51, 54-68 (1992).
See Vincent Blasi, ‘The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory’ [1977] Am. B Found. 
Res. J 521.
5 Thus A. J. Liebling’s quip: freedom of the press is guaranteed to all those who own one; 
A. J. Liebling, The Press (1975), 32.
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the drafters of the 1934 Communications Act took pains to specify 
that a broadcast licensee ‘shall not... be deemed a common carrier’, 
required by law to carry programming provided by others.'’ Indeed, 
the FCC for many years deemed it an abdication of a broadcaster’s 
public-interest duty for it to relinquish legal control over the program­
ming it broadcast.’
Beginning in the 1940s, US policymakers built up a set of ragged, 
not always articulated, understandings flowing from these two as­
sumptions. Different media owners would provide different media 
voices. More owners would mean more voices. A range of owners 
would lead to a range of views. A multiplicity of owners would lead to 
competition; competition would lead to robust, open discussion. Ac­
cess by speakers would be more nearly equal, in part because media 
outlets would be sympathetic to a wider variety of views.
The Federal Communications Commission drew on this vision in 
developing its concentration policies; it sought to achieve ‘diversifica­
tion of program and service viewpoints’, and thus the preconditions 
for democratic discourse, by encouraging diversity in ownership.** 
Rather than seeking to regulate speech content directly, it promul­
gated rules establishing what might be called an ‘ownership access’ 
policy.
The Commission began in 1938 by adopting a strong presumption 
against allowing two or more AM radio stations under common own­
ership in a single community.’’ Within a short time, the Commission 
had rules in place barring the ownership in a single market of more 
than one station in any given broadcast service—AM, FM, or televi­
sion. Until 1970, though, FCC rules still allowed a person to own an 
AM, an FM, and a television station in the same community. The FCC 
partially plugged that gap in 1970 and 1971, banning the acquisition by 
a single entity, in a single market, of both a radio and a VHF television 
station.The agency explained:
A proper objective is the maximum diversity of ownership that technology 
permits in each area. We are of the view that 60 different licensees are more
47 use § 153(h). The Communications Act itself provides some exceptions to this rule; the 
most important is 47 USC § 312(a)(7), requiring broadcasters to sell reasonable amounts of time 
to candidates for federal elective office for political advertising: see Columbia Broadcasting 
System v. FCC, 453 US 367 (1981).
The Sup. Ct. relied on s. 153(h) when, in 1979, it struck down FCC rules requiring cable 
systems to offer channels for public, educational, and governmental use. Those rules, the Court 
explained, impermissibly imposed common-carrier obligations; FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 
440 US 689 (1979). Congress later revisited that issue in the Cable Communications Policy Act 
of 1984; see text accompanying n. 35 below.
’ See, e.g.. Cosmopolitan Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 581 F2d 917 (DC Cir. 1978); Filing of 
Agreements Involving the Sale of Broadcast Time for Resale, 33 FCC2d 654 (1972). The Commis­
sion largely abandoned that position in Part-Time Programming, 82 FCC2d 107 (1980).
* Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership, 18 FCC 288, 292-3 (1953).
’ Genessee Radio Corp., 5 FCC 183 (1938).
Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and TV Broadcast Stations, 28 FCC2d 662 (1971) 
(reconsidering Multiple Ownership, 22 FCC2d 306 (1970)).
desirable than 50, and even that 51 are more desirable than 50. In a rapidly 
changing social climate, communication of ideas is vital. If a city has 60 
frequencies available but they are licensed to only 50 different licensees, the 
number of sources for ideas is not maximized. It might be the 51st licensee 
that would become the communication channel for a solution to a severe 
social crisis."
The FCC relaxed its ‘one-to-a-market’ rules in 1989, and again in 
1992. After 1992, licensees were allowed to own up to three or four 
radio stations in a given market,'^ and the Commission was indulgent 
towards requests for waiver, in large markets, of the bar on radio- 
VHF combinations.'^
The FCC began in 1940 to limit the number of broadcast outlets that 
could be owned by a single entity in different geographical markets. 
Under rules promulgated in 1953 and 1954, no entity could own more 
than seven AM, seven FM, and seven television stations (of which no 
more than five could be VHF) nationwide.''' This approach, the 
Commission explained, would promote ‘diversification of program 
services’ without ‘governmental encroachment on ... the prime re­
sponsibility of the broadcast licensee’."’ The Commission later relaxed 
these rules, too, in 1984 and again in 1992. After 1992, one was allowed 
to own twenty AM and twenty FM radio stations nationwide.'" One 
could own up to twelve television stations, provided that their aggre­
gate reach was no more than 25 per cent of the national audience.'''
The most elaborate FCC articulation of the relationship of owner­
ship to public discourse came in the context of newspaper-broadcast 
cross-ownership. The agency first addressed this question in 1970. In 
almost 100 cities, newspapers and television stations were under com­
mon control. In a few communities, the daily newspaper was under 
common ownership with the only radio or television station. The FCC 
determined that this concentration of ownership was inconsistent with 
its assumptions about democratic discourse. It banned the formation
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" Multiple Ownership, n. 10 above, 311.
Radio Multiple Ownership Rules, 1 FCCRcd. 6387 (1992), on reconsideration, 9 FCCRcd. 
7183 (1994).
See Second Report and Order, 4 FCCRcd. 1741, reconsideration, 4 FCCRcd. 6489 (1989).
Rules and Regulations Relating to Multiple Ownership, 18 FCC 288 (1953), 43 FCC 2797 
(1954). The Sup. Ct. upheld the rules in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 US 192 
(1956).
'' Multiple Ownership, n, 14 above, 293.
Radio Multiple Ownership Rules, n. 12 above. A minority owner could hold up to five 
additional stations in each service; a non-minority holder could hold non-controlling interests in 
up to five additional minority or small-business controlled stations.
Amendment of Multiple Ownership Rules, 100 FCC2d 17 (1984), on reconsideration, 100 
FCC2d 74 (1985). UHF stations were counted at only one-half of their theoretical reach, because 
of the physical limitations of their signals. Minority owners could hold up to 14 stations, and non­
minority owners could acquire non-controlling interests in two additional minority-controlled 
stations. Aggregate audience reach could be as high as 30%, provided that 5% of that reach was 
contributed by minority-controlled stations.
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of new newspaper-broadcast combinations, and required divestiture 
where the owner of the sole newspaper in a community was also the 
owner of the sole television station, or of the sole radio station in 
a community that had no television station.'" It was intolerable, said 
the Commission, to allow such an entity an ‘effective monopoly’ 
in the local market-place of ideas. The Supreme Court affirmed; it 
upheld as rational the Commission’s finding that ‘diversification of 
ownership would enhance the possibility of achieving greater diversity 
of viewpoints’.'®
Congress and the FCC imposed cross-ownership restrictions in 
other areas. It was illegal for a person to control a television broadcast 
station and a cable system in the same market.^" It was illegal for a 
person to control a telephone company and a cable system in the same 
area.^’
Much of US broadcast regulation since 1934 was based on, and 
sought to reinforce, the link between ownership and content. That 
connection was crucial if the Commission were to pursue a policy of 
ownership access—if it were to bring about diversity of speech 
through ownership regulation. The emergence of radio networks pro­
vided one early threat to that link. The Commission initiated exten­
sive inquiries in 1938 into the new ‘chain broadcasting’, reflecting its 
concern that binding contractual relationships made national net­
works the true owners of local stations rather than the local licensees. 
Those contractual relationships threatened the Commission’s ideal of 
discourse driven by independent, competitive local voices. The FCC 
announced regulations intended to ensure the ‘independence’ of the 
local outlets, emphasizing the local broadcaster’s ability to replace 
network offerings with programming more idiosyncratically respon­
sive to the community of licence.^^
Later on, the Commission sought to address the link between own­
ership and content from a different perspective: it provided that it 
would grant a preference, in comparative licensing hearings, to own-
Second Report and Order, 50 FCC2d 1046 (1974), on reconsideration, 53 FCC2d 589 (1975), 
aff d in part & rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Citizens Comm, for Broadcasting v. FCC 555 F2d 938 
(DC Cir. 1977), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 436 US 775 (1978).
FCC V. Nat’l Citizens Comm, for Broadcasting, 436 US 775, 796 (1978).
» 47 use § 533(a).
Ibid. § 533(b). The constitutionality of that prohibition was hotly contested. See e.g. 
Chesapeake and Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated for 
consideration of mootness, 116 SCt 2374 (1996). The FCC took the position that it could waive 
this prohibition for telephone companies complying with its video dialtone rules. Telephone 
Company—Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rule, 10 FCCRcd. 7887 (1995).
See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 US 190 (1943). In 1977, the Commission 
repealed almost all of its rules governing the network-affiliate relationship in radio: Network 
Broadcasting by Standard (AM) and FM Broadcast Stations, 63 FCC2d 674 (1977). Over the past 
year, the Commission has proposed to repeal almost all of its rules regulating the network- 
affiliate relationship in television. See, in particular. Programming Practices of Broadcast Televi­
sion Networks and Affiliates, 1995 FCC LEXIS 3979 (15 June 1995).
ers who promised that they would participate in station management 
on a full-time basis.^^ An ownership access policy, after all, would 
make rather less sense if owners did not involve themselves in station 
management and programming decisions.^'*
Probably the clearest example of FCC reliance on assumptions 
about the relationship of ownership to narrative, in attempting to 
achieve the conditions for democratic discourse, was the agency’s 
effort to encourage ownership of radio and television stations by 
minority group members. The FCC gave minority group members 
special, privileged opportunities to become owners, granting those 
groups enhanced opportunities to compete in the arena that one of us 
has called the ‘market for loyalties’.^^ The Commission gave an advan­
tage in comparative hearings to minority would-be licensees, so long 
as they promised to participate actively in station management; it gave 
other licensees facing possible revocation or non-renewal an incentive 
to transfer their licences to minority owners; and it established a tax 
certificate programme granting favourable tax treatment to any 
broadcaster selling its station to a minority owner
The Commission designed these programmes in order to influence 
the mix of views and images presented by broadcasters,^'' and de­
fended them in the Supreme Court on precisely that basis: expanded 
minority ownership, the Commission argued, would produce more 
diversity in broadcast speech. In 1990, a majority of the Supreme 
Court agreed.^*^ The Court gave weight to FCC and congressional 
statements finding a link between expanded minority ownership and 
greater broadcast diversity.^^ It cited evidence that ‘an owner’s minor­
ity status influences the selection of topics for news coverage and the 
presentation of editorial viewpoint, especially on matters of particular 
concern to minorities’, and that ‘a minority owner is more likely to
104 Monroe Price and Jonathan Weinberg
See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 FCC2d 393, 395-6 (1965).
Last year, the DC Circuit declared the FCC’s focus on owner participation in station 
management to be arbitrary, and hence impermissible: Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F3d 875 (DC Cir. 
1994).
“ See Monroe Price, ‘The Market for Loyalties: Electronic Media and the Global Competi­
tion for Allegiances’, 104 Yale LJ 667 (1994).
® See Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 FCC2d 979 (1978). On the tax 
certificate programme, see Bruce R. Wilde, Note, ‘FCC Tax Certificates for Minority Ownership 
of Broadcast Facilities: A Critical Re-Examination of Policy’, 138 U Pa. LRev. 979 (1990).
The Commission gave women a similar preference in comparative hearings, see Mid-Florida 
Television Corp., 70 FCC2d 281, 326 (Rev. Bd. 1978), set aside on other grounds, 87 FCC2d 203 
(1981), but it did not include women in the distress sale or tax certificate programmes. The DC 
Circuit held the comparative preference for women unconstitutional in Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 
F2d 382 (DC Cir. 1992).
See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 FCC2d 979 
(1978).
“ Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 US 547 (1990); see Michel Rosenfeld, 'Metro Broad­
casting, Inc. V. FCO. Affirmative Action at the Crossroads of Constitutional Liberty and Equal­
ity’, 38 UCLA LRev. 583 (1991).
® 497 US at 569.
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employ minorities in managerial and other important roles where 
they can have an impact on station policies’.3" A 1995 Supreme Court 
decision disfavouring any sort of racially-defined government prefer­
ence, though, left the programme moribund;^' the Commission is now 
reconsidering all of its licensing preferences.^^
The FCC’s ownership access policy had a mechanical truth to it. If 
one is seeking to achieve diversity in speech, a system with more 
owners seems better than one with fewer. The policy’s assumptions, 
however, were incomplete. Its descriptive predicate—that a speaker’s 
identity strongly determines the content of its speech—underesti­
mated the flattening and homogenizing effect of the commercial 
market-place. In broadcast television, where the numbers of speakers 
in each local market have been few and each licensee has sought to 
attract a lowest-common-denominator mass market, broadcast offer­
ings have been largely homogenous notwithstanding the Commis­
sion’s diversity efforts. For the most part, network affiliates have 
simply adopted or ‘cleared’ network programming during prime time. 
Even non-network offerings have tended to vary little, in significant 
respect, from one speaker to the next. Broadcast television licensees, 
no matter how diverse, tend to choose their programming with an eye 
to maximizing audiences and advertising revenues.-*’ In radio, the 
market is more fractionalized, but the likelihood is still small that any 
speaker speaks with a genuinely distinctive voice.
Nor has the slight racial diversity in ownership achieved by the FCC 
led to the kind of programme diversity with overtones important in 
furthering pluralist goals. At the margin, stations owned by minority 
groups are somewhat more sensitive to minority issues; perhaps they 
have better affirmative action records. But there has not been a con­
vincing showing that, where a broadcast owner is interested in maxi­
mizing profit, the nature of the speech varies substantially with the 
nature of the owner.
Cable brought a different perspective to the video market. In the 
vast majority of US markets, the cable operator is a local monopolist. 
While cable television has brought many more channels to each 
household, each cable operator more or less controls its entire system, 
choosing each of the programmers that the system will carry. On the 
other hand, a profit-maximizing cable operator will likely seek to 
carry diverse programme channels in order to increase subscribers.
» Ibid. 580-1.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 SCt. 2097 (1995).
” See Reexamination of the Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 7 FCCRcd. 
2664 (1992), 8 FCCRcd. 5475 (1993), 9 FCCRcd. 2821 (1994). Congress has acted independently 
to end the tax certificate programme.
” See generally C. Edwin Baker, ‘Advertising and a Democratic Press’, 140 UPa. LRev. 
2097 (1992); Jonathan Weinberg, ‘Broadcasting and Speech’, 81 Calif LRev. 1101, 1152-7 
(1993).
Cable operators have no day-to-day control over those programming 
services once they make the initial choice to carry them. (The strategy 
is reminiscent of the argument, long made in the context of European 
broadcasting but ill-tolerated at the FCC, that a single manager of 
frequencies will maximize audience by purposely and rationally diver­
sifying, playing to small segments, in the way that only a monopolist 
can do.) Cable’s programming structure thus achieves greater diver­
sity in programme offerings at the cost of tearing a small hole in the 
central assumption of US concentration rules, the link between own­
ership of communications facilities and meaningful control over the 
messages conveyed by speech using those facilities.
Perhaps recognizing that shift, federal cable television regulation 
began to incorporate common-carrier aspects. The 1984 Cable 
Communications Policy Act requires larger cable systems to make 
leased-access channels available to unaffiliated programmers, without 
regard to the content of the programming the outside programmers 
provide.^'* The same Act authorizes local franchising authorities to 
require cable operators to provide public access channels, and 
channels reserved for educational or governmental use; the cable 
operator is forbidden to exercise editorial control over those chan­
nels.^'’ The Federal Communications Commission promulgated ‘video 
dialtone’ rules allowing telephone companies to distribute video 
programming only if they established common-carrier platforms 
accommodating multiple outside programmers on a non-discrimina- 
tory basis.’’* Cable’s position in the video market paved the way for a 
new approach to access and diversity issues, one with a role for com­
mon carrier regulation. Even the most passionate critics of FCC regu­
lation of broadcasting conceded the legal permissibility—if not 
desirability—of common carrier regulation of the old and the new 
media.-^^
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47 use § 532. The efficacy of this provision is unclear; battles continue to rage over the 
rates that programmers must pay for leased access. In 1992, Congress amended the statute to 
allow cable operators to decline to carry leased-access programming ‘that the cable operator 
reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently 
offensive manner as measured by contemporary community standards’. Cable Television Con­
sumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 10(a), 106 Stat. 1460, 
1486 (1992) (codified at 47 USC § 532(h)); see Denver Area Educ. Telecom. Consortium v. FCC, 
116 set 2374 (1996).
47 USC § 531. Congress in 1992 directed the FCC to promulgate regulations enabling cable 
operators to prohibit, on such channels, programming that contains ‘sexually explicit conduct, or 
material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct’. Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 10(c), 106 Stat. 1460, 1486 (1992); see Denver 
Area Educ. Telecom. Consortium, n. 34 above.
* See Telephone Company—Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules (Reconsideration and 
Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), n. 21 above. These rules were superseded by 
the open video system provisions of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
” See Thomas G. Krattenmaker and L. A. Powe, Jr., ‘Converging First Amendment Princi­
ples for Converging Communications Media’, 104 Yale LJ 1719,1737-9 (1995).
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III
Today, the old approach to ownership regulation lies in ruins. It is no 
longer possible to think about regulation in terms of separated catego­
ries—broadcasting and telecommunications—for the transmission of 
information. In the new global economy, many US legislators see 
more need to support huge media entities that can compete interna­
tionally and contribute to a more favourable balance of payments 
than to ensure that minorities within the borders of the United States 
have their say. In the eyes of many, the new abundance of channels of 
communication means that government need no longer seek to ensure 
diverse and competing speakers.
The FCC, at the start of 1995, spurred by huge increases in the 
number of broadcast outlets, proposed to dismantle much of its re­
maining ownership regulation. It solicited comment on whether it 
should relax its rule forbidding ownership of two television stations in 
a single market, whether it should relax or even eliminate its bar on 
radio-TV combinations in a single market, and whether it should 
eliminate its numerical station limit on ownership of television sta­
tions in different markets, perhaps raising the aggregate audience 
reach cap as high as 50 per cent.^*’
The FCC’s proposals were overtaken by Congressional action. The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 drastically overhauls broadcast 
ownership rules. It eliminates any national limitation on radio or 
television station ownership, beyond a solitary ban on control of 
television stations that, in the aggregate, reach more than 35 per cent 
of the nation’s population. It sharply loosens local radio ownership 
rules, allowing a single entity to own five to eight commercial radio 
stations in a given market. It further relaxes the limits on radio-TV 
combinations. It eliminates the cable-broadcast cross-ownership ban. 
It invites more deregulation at the hands of the FCC.
What philosophy and structure does the new law supply, as it 
sweeps the old rules away? The law’s goals are sweeping: it contem­
plates a world in which all Americans have access to ‘high-speed, 
switched, broadband telecommunications capability’ enabling users 
to ‘originate and receive high-quality . . . graphics and video telecom­
munications’. Its drafters hope to achieve that end through a heavy 
dose of competition—the product of radical deregulation—and a hint 
of new common carrier thinking.
The Act starts by imposing a duty on local telephone companies to 
provide full interconnection, and non-discriminatory access, to other 
entities seeking to provide local telecommunications services. By re-
^ Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, 10 FCCRcd. 
3524, 3568, 3575-8, 3580-1 (1995).
quiring interconnection, the drafters plan to subject local tele­
phone companies to competition from cable companies and new 
local telecommunications providers. The Act pre-empts local- 
government barriers to cable companies’ provision of telecommunica­
tions services.
In return for interconnection, the Act grants the telephone compa­
nies a variety of boons. First, with FCC permission, they can provide 
long-distance service. Indeed, the FCC may approve a telephone 
company’s entry into the long-distance market, carrying calls originat­
ing in its local service area, even if the company is not in fact subject 
to competition in its local service area. It is enough that the company 
has filed, and the FCC and State authorities have approved, a state­
ment of the terms pursuant to which it would offer interconnection if 
it received a bona fide request.
The statute promises telephone companies flexibility in FCC rate 
regulation, directing the agency to eliminate such regulation where it 
is not necessary to ensure just and non-discriminatory rates. It in­
cludes only weak provisions designed to ensure continuation of serv­
ice to poor and rural users. It authorizes telephone companies to offer 
‘electronic publishing’ and other information services.
Most important for purposes of this essay, the Act authorizes tel­
ephone companies to provide video programming. Telephone compa­
nies have the option of acting as traditional cable operators, subject 
to local franchising requirements and other regulation.^® The law, 
though, gives telephone companies a more attractive option: they are 
freed from local franchising and regulation if they choose to offer 
programming over ‘open video systems’.^^® The operator of such a 
system may not (once demand for carriage exceeds its channel capac­
ity) select the programming on more than one-third of its channels, 
and may not discriminate among video providers with regard to car­
riage.'" It may not unreasonably discriminate in its own favour with 
regard to information provided to subscribers for purposes of select­
ing programming, although it may negotiate disparate contracts with 
unaffiliated providers ‘to allow consumer access to their signals on any 
level or screen of any gateway, menu or program guide’. It is subject 
to rules, to be prescribed by the FCC, ensuring that it offers public 
access, and carries the signals of local broadcast stations, on terms 
similar to those governing conventional cable systems.
The Act appears to subject open video systems to no rate regulation 
at all. It removes almost all rate regulation of conventional cable 
television service by 31 March 1999.
” Under most circumstances, however, a local telephone company can buy no more than 10% 
of an existing cable company in its service area.
* The operators of such systems, however, can be required to pay fees to local governments 
in lieu of cable franchise fees.
The statute leaves it to the FCC to devise the process by which the system’s remaining 
channels are to be programmed.
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This legislation reflects a marked shift in philosophy. The old rules 
were based on the assumption that diversity of ownership, both in 
terms of the number of owners and the kinds of owners, would mean 
diversity of views. They presupposed a government role in ensuring 
a large and diverse set of speakers. The new rules experiment with a 
breakdown of the link between content and conduit; they suggest 
a role for some sort of common carrier regulation. They otherwise 
seek to replace regulation with competition as the engine of 
diversity.
A variety of different changes have come together here. In part, the 
shift in federal law derives from changes in ideology. Over the last 
twenty years, a fervour for the workings of the market has overtaken 
a commitment to federal intervention. Aside from regulation of sexu­
ally explicit speech (where intrusive regulation is increasingly in 
vogue), policymakers now impose a far heavier burden of proof on 
those who would justify regulatory controls. The FCC has so favoured 
deregulation that none of the traditional restrictions, including those 
on cross-ownership, have seemed secure. The idea that there should 
be special efforts to encourage minority voices in the media now is 
relegated to the dustbin of history. Worries that no media company 
should be too large have given way to ideas that bigness is valuable. 
Scholars who long argued that vertical integration, e.g. between cable 
operators and video programme services was not as important as 
horizontal integration have prevailed, and even horizontal integration 
is no longer out of the question.
This deregulatory fervour has been matched by a shift in First 
Amendment thinking, emphasizing limits on government’s ability to 
prescribe market barriers and market structure. By the mid-1990s, it 
was common for judges to hold that the First Amendment right to 
speak protected not only individuals and newspapers, not only broad­
casters, but also cable systems and telephone companies. Laws that 
precluded telephone companies from providing video service sud­
denly were cast into constitutional doubt.
Ideology and constitutional law aside, an obvious source of regula­
tory change was change in technology. Technological changes brought 
about the so-called ‘end of scarcity’: the creation of seeming abun­
dance in channels of distribution. Beyond that, they made regulatory 
market segmentation increasingly artificial and increasingly ineffi­
cient. Vertical integration of distribution services and programming 
services proceeded rapidly in the 1980s. Broadcast and cable proper­
ties came under common ownership (though, by law, not in the same 
market). Because of these new styles of building businesses, federally 
enforced cartelization—separating telephony, cable, broadcast, and 
newspapers—no longer enjoyed private support. The large players
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wanted to acquire or be acquired; they saw federal restrictions as 
obsolete.
The technological changes also mean that the United States cannot 
make policy for the electronic media in isolation from the rest of the 
world. We have seen global shifts in the structure of telecommunica­
tions carriers and video providers. Dissolving federal regulation is 
now seen as a method of increasing the power of one of America’s 
major contributors to a favourable balance of payments. Entertain­
ment is so important an export, in terms of economics and interna­
tional politics, that the Congress and the government are inordinately 
inclined to help the industry position itself to dominate the world 
market. More generally, the increasingly global nature of the commu­
nications market-place is forcing a global harmonization of communi­
cations rules. It would be impossible, over time, to maintain an 
equilibrium in which companies with global pretensions have mark­
edly different structures in America and throughout the world.
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1. Introduction
The scope of the present article is to review the operation of section 
4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 which allows a court to order 
the postponement of media reports of court proceedings. Undoubt­
edly a less draconian measure than others which prohibit publication 
at any point in the future,' it should however be remembered that, in 
a context in which the instantaneous transmission of information is 
highly prized, news postponed often ceases to be news at all, hence the 
seriousness with which the media regard such restrictions. It is not 
intended in the present discussion to provide a survey of other statu­
tory and common law controls over media reports of open court 
proceedings which today heavily qualify the principle of open justice 
enunciated by the House of Lords in Scott v. Scott [1913] AC 417.^ 
Instead, attention will be focused upon judicial regulation of the con­
flict between free speech interests and those of fair trial and the 
proper administration of justice when it is alleged that unfettered 
reporting of on-going court proceedings will cause prejudice to those 
proceedings or others which are pending or imminent.
This chapter begins by analysing the common law prior to the 
1981 Act. The form and subsequent interpretation of section 4(2) 
are then examined. Attention is later given to some important 
procedural issues which emerged once the power of postponement 
began to be used. One of my main contentions in respect of develop­
ments in England and Wales will be that, while some evidence exists
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